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Religion and Religions 
Max Charlesworth 
The 'scandal' of religious diversity 
Perhaps the most striking fact about religions is that there are so many of 
them. This paper is an attempt to walk around the implications of this fact and to 
suggest how religious believers might cope with what has been called 'the scandal 
of religious diversity'. In this I am using some ideas discussed in my recent book 
Religious Inventions (1997). 
As I have remarked, it is a brute fact that there are many diverse religious 
systems and that all of them, in one way or another, claim to be true, in some sense 
of that difficult word, as a body of teachings and as a way oflife and as a 'revelation' 
or manifestation of the 'divine' or whatever term we use for the 'object' of religion. 
The problem is of course: how can all these religious systems and their 'revelations' 
be true since their truth claims very often appear to be incompatible with each other? 
But the world religions - Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Taoism etc.- do make truth claims and argue that they are the custodians of a body of 
divinely revealed truths, and it is not difficult to see that there are prima facie conflicts 
and contradictions and incommensurable differences between the truths proclaimed 
by the various religions. 
Most religions have ways of dealing with the prima facie scandal of religious 
diversity . At one extreme there is the way of absolutism and exclusion: my religious 
system is absolutely and exclusively true and is the sole true way of life, and this 
means that all other religious systems and ways of life are false in so far as they 
differ from my religion. In this simple-minded view, what is seen as the present 
regrettable situation of religious diversity and division has come about through sin 
and ignorance leading people to follow 'false gods' and when that is remedied 
diversity will vanish and true religious unity will prevail. In other words diversity is 
a wholly contingent feature of religions. 
At the other extreme there is the way of syncretism (although this is not a 
wholly apt term) which sees the different religious systems as particular, and partial, 
manifestations or expressions of a set of basic truths. Suitably interpreted and reduced 
to their essentials the various religious systems all say very much the same things or, 
to use the familiar metaphor, they are different paths to the same destination. This is 
the position of what might be called 'vulgar Hinduism' and of the syncretism of 
Aldous Huxley's philosophia perennis and certain other philosophers of religion 
such as Fritjof Schuon. The title of Schuon's celebrated book The Transcendental 
Unity of Religions (1984) epitomises this position: the inner meaning of all the 
world religions is the same even though they differ externally in the way they 
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conceptualise and express that meaning. 
Between those two simple-minded extremes (both of which, I believe, are 
unacceptable) there is a spectrum of other possible positions and it is these positions 
that I wish to discuss here. 
Awareness of religious diversity is, in a sense, as old as religion itself. The Old 
Testament is full of allusions to other religions - the Middle East was always the 
California of the ancient world - and Christianity was born into a world of competing 
religious systems. (It is worth remarking that the Old Testament acknowledges the 
holiness of many 'good pagans', for example, Enoch, Daniel, Noah, Job, Melchizedek, 
Lot, the Queen of Sheba (Danielou 1957)). Again, the religions of the early Israelites 
was powerfully influenced by the Canaanite deities - El and his consort Asherah, 
Baal and his consort Anat et al. Early Israelite religion was not exclusively 
monotheistic and there is no doubt that there was a tolerance of other Gods (Smith 
1990). 
However, Justin and other early Christian 'Apologists' in the 2nd century, 
while holding that Christianity was a 'philosophy', also maintained that it was not 
merely one philosophy among others but the philosophy. The truths that had been 
"scattered and dispersed throughout Greek philosophy had been synthesised and 
systematised in Christian philosophy. Each Greek philosopher, they wrote, had 
possessed only a portion of the logos itself, incarnated in Jesus Christ" (Hadot 
1995:128). 
However, serious theological discussion of the problem of "religious pluralism" 
from within the religious sphere is largely a phenomenon only of this century. In the 
Roman Catholic Church it is in fact much more recent, with the work of the great 
Jesuit theologian, Karl Rahner, and the establishment of the Secretariat for Non-
Christian Religions by the Second Vatican Council being the catalyst'. 
I do not propose to engage here in a formal philosophical discussion about the 
problem of religious diversity. There is now a large philosophical and theological 
literature about the problem- one thinks of the work of Karl Rahner, John Hick, 
Raimundo Pannikar. Paul Knitter, Henri Corbin and others - and an even larger 
corpus of 'pop' theological writing. Further, the post modernist critique of the 
universalism of the European enlightenment and its emphasis on 'meta-narratives', 
and the new focus on localism and pluralism has played a part (Knitter 1985: D' Costa 
1986; Hick & Knitter 1987; Phah 1991; Kung & Moltmrum 1986: Oxtoby 1983). 
Again, I am not concerned with those who hold that religion as a whole is an illusion 
and that all religions are false and there is no realm of 'the divine'. Instead, I look at 
the question of religious diversity from within the religious sphere, so to speak. In 
other words, the question I pose is this: "how can a Christian or a Buddhist or a 
Hindu, or for that matter a member of an Australian Aboriginal people, come to 
terms with the fact that there are other and different and incompatible religious 
systems in the world? What modifications in one's religious position as a Buddhist 
or a Christian or a Hindu has one to make in order to accommodate this fact so that 
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a person might say, "I am a Christian or a Hindu or a Muslim or a member of the 
Australian Pitjantjatjara people and I believe that the teachings of my religion are 
true in some sense, but at the same time I recognise and accept the fact that there are 
other religious systems and that other people believe that the teachings of their 
religion are true?" 
The Ecumenical Movement 
One can get some preliminary enlightenment here by reflecting on what has 
happened in the ecumenical movement among the mainstream Christian Churches 
since the 1950s. In this I am following Raimundo Pannikar and others who have 
pointed to the analogies between the attempts to cope with the diversity among the 
Christian Churches and recent attempts to cope with the wider problem of diversity 
among the world religions. The ecumenical movement has had a long and chequered 
history and of course many fundamentalist Christian sects still reject its whole raison 
d' etre. However, a number of lessons have emerged from the ecumenical discussions 
so far. 
First, the goal of unity among the Christian Churches is not strict or exclusive 
unity in the sense of theological and ecclesiological and ritual uniformity. It is admitted 
that there have been, and will continue to be, wide differences in how the credal 
essentials of Christianity are interpreted and practiced in the various Christian 
traditions, though the definition of what is essential and what differences are tolerable 
is a matter for contention. 
Second, there now seems to be general agreement that the central theological 
and ecclesiological values of the various Christian traditions must, within certain 
limits, not just be tolerated but be recognised in a positive way and respected as 
genuine, quasi-autonomous 'developments' within Christianity. This kind of 
recognition and respect has always been there as between the Western (or 'Latin') 
Church and the Eastern Churches with their very different theological cultures, 
forms of spirituality and Church structures, and it has now to some extent been 
extended to most other mainstream Christian traditions. The implication of this that 
no one Christian Church can claim to be the sole repository of Christian truth, 
although it may claim that it is a paradigmatic form of Christianity which, so to 
speak, sets the standard or bench-mark for 'orthodoxy'. 
Third, an implication of the ecumenical discussions between the Christian 
Churches is that genuine doctrinal and ecclesiological developments, in Newman's 
sense of that term, even of a radical kind, are possible in the future. The so-called 
'deposit of faith' is not fixed and static (as the various forms of fundamentalism 
claim) but dynamic and open to change in the sense that virtualities and possibilities 
in the original 'revelation' are continually being disclosed. As Derrida and others 
have reminded us, the meaning of a text can never be circumscribed or defmed 
exhaustively, and one can say the same of the meaning of the original Christian 
revelation. In a particular age or historical/cultural context certain implicit 
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possibilities or virtualities in the original revelation may be brought out or 'developed' 
in a way that would not have been possible in other ages or contexts. Take, for 
example, the contemporary emphasis upon the social justice dimension of the Gospel 
with its concomitants in the movement of 'liberation theology' and the idea that the 
Church must be (in Hans Kung's description) 'the dwelling place of freedom'. Or 
again, one may consider the recognition of women's authority in the Church as a 
similar development. The concept of 'tradition' is clearly important here. 
In parenthesis, it is because they are genuine developments, that is, making 
explicit what was implicit in the original revelation, though this is usually recognised 
in hindsight, that it is misguided to look for explicit intimations of the 'social Gospel', 
or liberation theology, or women's ecclesial authority in the literal text of the Gospels, 
or in the concrete details of the life of Jesus, or in the history of the early Christian 
Church. There are, of course, large problems with the idea of doctrinal and religious 
development and how authentic developments are to be distinguished from false 
developments. Many Christians, for example, see the ordination of women priests 
as a valid development but many others contest this. 
At a more radical level, there is a sense in which all the elements of a religion 
are the product of human invention, a process of creative reception and interpretation 
and concretisation of an original 'revelation' of the Divine. A contemporary Christian 
theologian has said: Jesus did not found Christianity "it was founded by Jesus earliest 
followers on the foundation of his transformation of Judaism" (Sykes 1984:20). 
Those early followers were in turn powerfully influenced by the interaction, at the 
end of classical antiquity, between very different systems of thought and theological-
philosophical 'discourses', Jewish, Greek, Roman and so on. In this interaction, 
new meanings appeared and new possibilities of evolution of the original revelation 
were disclosed. 
Ecumenical discussions have emphasised that the original Christian revelation 
is, as has already been noted, historically and culturally mediated. We know, for 
example, that the present systems of Church organisation and government have all 
developed historically and in a culturally contingent way so that it is quite possible 
to envisage other, and radically different, forms or structures of organisation. Even 
those Christian churches which emphasise their continuity with 'the Church of the 
Apostles' recognise this. In addition, it is recognised that any particular historical/ 
cultural form or structure of Christianity must obey the law of all such cultural 
structures, namely that certain benefits are always purchased at a certain cost. There 
are no 'perfect' structures where the benefits are unalloyed and unrestricted. 
At the present time then the position of a Christian belonging to one of the 
mainline Churches has changed quite radically from what it typically was fifty years 
ago. The Christian believer now has to say, "I am a Roman Catholic or an Anglican 
or member of the Greek Orthodox Church or of the Reformed Churches because I 
believe that my Church expresses the values of the Gospel in a paradigmatic or pure 
way. However, I acknowledge that other Christian Churches (within certain limits) 
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have developed the values of the Gospel in their own very different ways in their 
liturgy, spirituality, prayer, sacraments, theological reflection, Church organisation 
and government, social concern etc., and I recognise and accept this. In this sense I 
acknowledge that I can no longer claim that my Church is the sole 'true' Church, 
although I still wish to claim some kind of special status for my Church and its 
teaching". 
From this point of view, ecumenical dialogue between the Christian Churches 
becomes not just an option but a necessity. To put this in another way, there has been 
a gradual recognition that the diversity between the Christian Churches should not 
be seen as some kind of regrettable 'fall' from a primordial unity of belief- the result 
of human willfulness and ignorance- but as a phenomenon having a positive meaning 
in itself. 
I am sure that the various Church officials engaged in ecumenical discussion 
would not subscribe to all the implications of Christian ecumenism I have been 
trying to tease out here. Again, for the moment I leave aside the question whether, 
philosophically speaking, the position I have been describing is a coherent one. I 
believe that it is coherent and that there are certain (limping) analogies with the 
view of science that has emerged from contemporary philosophy of science (for 
example, that historically there have been competing models or paradigms in science 
and that these models are relatively 'incommensurable'). 
However, I believe that we can use the insights gained through the ecumenical 
movement to confront the problems raised by the diversity of world religions. The 
problems are, of course, very different since the diversity between the traditions 
within a religious system (within Christianity, for example) is different from the 
diversity between religious systems (between Christianity and Buddhism, for 
example). The latter is of course a much more radical form of diversity. 
What is the deep meaning of religious diversity? 
As I remarked before, any religious believer has to acknowledge and come to 
terms with, and have some kind of theory about, the brute fact that there are many 
diverse religious systems with prima facie incompatible forms of religious belief 
and practice. What, for a religious believer, is the meaning of this diversity? Is it to 
be seen as just as an unfortunate accident, or something that has come about through 
sin and hubris and ignorance (compare the myth of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 
11:1-9)) 2, or as an illusion, or does it have some deeper purpose to it? To put it 
naively, if there is a God what does God mean by it? What divine purpose, if any, 
does this variety and diversity serve? Is it something positively willed by God as part 
of a grand plan, or is it a consequence of what Christians call the 'Fall'? What are 
we to think, if we are Christians, of the fact that Christianity appeared as an historical 
phenomenon some 50,000 years after (so far as we know) the beginnings of Australian 
Aboriginal religion, for example? How are we to explain the religious interregnum 
between (to put it in a simple-minded way) the Creation and the manifestation of 
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Jesus Christ? Again, if religion is a human phenomenon and comes into being, so to 
speak, with the appearance of human beings in the universe and has relevance only 
so long as human beings are about, can we speak of 'pre-religious' and 'post religious' 
eras? I have been posing these questions from a Christian point of view, but of 
course these same questions can be posed, and have to be posed , in the terms of the 
other world religions. 
The early Christians thought that the religion of the New Testament simply 
complemented and 'fulfilled' the religion of the Old Testament as though the latter 
came into being at the moment of creation. But, as we know, Judaism came into 
being at a particular historical moment, much later than Hinduism and Buddhism 
and Taoism, and much later still than some of the so-called 'primal' religions such 
as Australian Aboriginal religions. If, to use the language of Western medieval 
theology, God desires or wills that all human beings should be 'saved', how was 
God's 'salvific will' manifested, and how were his purposes 'revealed', and what 
religious 'way' was available to humankind before Judaism and Christianity came 
on the scene? (The theological doctrine that everyone should be offered the means of 
salvation is a crucial one in this discussion, but it is difficult to analyse it since it 
seems to run counter to the idea of predestination that is so marked in a number of 
religions. Again, it seems to be at odds with dualistic forms of religion (Zoroastrianism 
and Manicheeism etc.) where we cannot assume that the good principle will always 
prevail over the evil principle and that the divine principle will always ensure that 
everyone is always offered the possibility of being saved. 
Even the most convinced and devout Jewish or Christian believer, who sees 
the Old Testament and/or the New Testament as 'God's own' revelation, has to 
ponder on what God was doing, so to speak, during the long historical gap or 
interregnum between the beginnings of humankind and the appearance of the 'chosen 
people', and later Jesus Christ's 'fulfillment' of the Old Testament. That period, 
when presumably 'primal religions' such as Australian Aboriginal religions 
flourished, must have had a positive meaning in God's plan; it cannot, for the believer 
at any rate, just have been a long period of divine silence and indifference. Any 
religious believer needs to have, one might say, some kind of theory about it. 
One would have to say, however, that so far the problem of religious diversity 
has been largely a Christian preoccupation. Certainly in some forms of Hinduism 
and Buddhism quasi-syncretistic solutions have been proposed (all religions 
fundamentally express the same truths) but that is in effect, as I shall argue in a 
moment, to deny that there is genuine religious diversity and that there is a problem 
about it. 
It has been suggested that the reason why Christians have been so concerned 
about religious diversity is (a) because of Christian guilt over past religious 
exclusivism and 'imperialism', (b) because of Western liberal ideas about the value 
of autonomy and (c) because of recent Western ideas about the 'relativism' of culture 
and of human knowledge. As it has been put: "Pluralism, with its view that every 
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religion has its own particular integrity, is a product of modern Western 
rationalisation. Pluralists are modernists who think that autonomy is the highest 
good" (Driver 1987). However, it could also be said, more positively, that Christian 
theologians have been perhaps more self-critical about their own belief systems and 
more open to the radical possibilities that reflection on religious diversity discloses. 
Facing up to the problem of religious diversity 
Put very schematically, there are a number of ways in which we can face up to 
this problem. First, as we noted before, one can maintain that Christianity is 
exclusively the one true religion and that all the other religions are simply false: 
they are forms of superstition rather than authentic religions, or at best fumbling 
attempts to express truths which are expressed more clearly and fully within 
Christianity. Christ alone is 'the way, the truth and the life' and there cannot be 
other valid religious ways. Non-Christians must therefore be converted or offered 
the opportunity of becoming Christians and the eventual hope of Christians must be 
that all other religions will be absorbed in some way into Christianity. (As mentioned 
before, this position can be translated into their own terms by Hindus or Buddhists 
or Jews or Muslims). 
However, this is not really an adequate answer to the problem of religious 
diversity since, in effect, it denies the reality of that diversity in that it makes it 
appear accidental and historically contingent, as though it could plausibly be held 
that the reason for religious diversity was simple ignorance and bad faith and that it 
could be remedied by more complete knowledge and good will. On theological 
grounds also, there are conclusive reasons for rejecting this position since it denies 
that God wills or desires that everyone should be 'saved' and that they have some 
available religious way of being saved. A kind of contradiction is involved in holding 
that God desires the salvation of all but in fact fails to provide accessible means for 
salvation. For example, if one held that only those who were baptised as Christians 
or who had received the teachings of the Qur'an,_or who had the example of the 
Buddha before them, could be saved or enlightened, then all those who lived before 
the time of Christ or Muhammad or Buddha would be denied the opportunity of 
being saved or enlightened. This doctrine about God's 'salvific will' i.e. God wills 
that all humans should be saved and therefore that all should be offered the means of 
being saved, is obviously a very difficult one since there are some religions where 
God prima facie 'predestines' some people not to be saved and we need to have some 
explanation about this. 
The second position of syncretism - all the world religions have the same 
essential meaning, though they express that meaning in different ways - is at the 
other extreme. It is, so I believe, vitiated by much the same objection already made 
against the absolutist/exclusivist position, namely that it does not take religious 
diversity seriously enough in that it assumes that diversity is an accidental and 
contingent feature of religions attempts to delineate the esoteric 'essence' which 
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represents the 'real meaning' of the multiplicity of religious systems inevitably do 
reductionist violence to the various particular systems. Equally inevitably, the 'real 
essence' turns out to be so abstract and de-contextualised and 'thin' as to be useless 
for practical religious purposes. Thus, for example, H.H. The Dalai Lama, claims 
that the common essence of all religions is the idea that the welfare and benefit of all 
sentient beings should be recognised and promoted (Carbazon 1988). 
The syncretist position also faces philosophical objections in that it simply 
assumes that the only way of removing the appearance of contradiction from the 
variously competing truth claims of the world religions is to suppose that they are 
really making essentially the same truth claims though expressed in different :vays. 
However, this neglects the fact that we are not looking at particular de-contextualised 
propositions in contradiction ('There is a God'/'There is no God'; 'Jesus is the Son 
of God' /'Jesus is simply a prophet or an enlightened one' etc.). The meaning of any 
religious proposition can only be determined by reference to a particular context or 
system and it is not at all clear how one can compare, at least directly, religious 
systems and the 'truth' of one system as against another. (The situation is all the 
more complex in that those systems usually have philosophical theories of one kind 
or another bound up with them. One thinks, for example, of the pervasive influence 
of neo-Platonism within Christianity or of the Indian Madhyamaka philosophical 
ideas on certain forms of Mahayana Buddhism.) 
As I noted before, one is reminded here of Thomas Kuhn's view about scientific 
systems and how difficult it is to compare apparently incompatible scientific 
propositions across systems and say that one is true and the other false. One is also 
reminded of contemporary 'post-modernist' criticisms of the de-contextualised 
universalism which derived from the Enlightenment, both in the sphere of knowledge 
and the sphere of ethics, and of attempts to revive the idea of 'tradition' and of 'local 
knowledge'. 
Parenthesis on the unity of religious experience 
The appeal to religious experience or 'mystical' experience, as distinct from 
religious teaching or doctrine or speculation has always appeared attractive to whose 
who wish to find a common underlying essence in the diverse religions. Religious 
revelations may differ radically in their doctrinal expressions and interpretations 
and theological speculations, but the religious experiences that occur to believers 
and devotees within the various traditions show, it is claimed, a remarkable 
commonality or unity. Notwithstanding the iinmense differences in expression and 
interpretations between, for example the Buddha, Meister Eckhart, Rumi, and 
Ramakrishna, they are all, it is said, basically reporting the same kind of 'core 
experiences'. 
Again, when philosophers of mysticism speaks of the 'core mystical 
experiences' it is implied that we discover them by looking inductively at the various 
mystical traditions and noting their core characteristics and seeing that they are 
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essentially the same. But in fact, when we look at the various forms of mystical 
experience, we have to look at them in their total context in order to see what they 
mean. We cannot abstract the Buddha's religious experience of 'the void' from the 
total theological and cultural context which gave that experience a meaning for him 
and for others. And we cannot abstract Eckhart's mystical experience of being 
'annihilated' in God from the total context which gave his experience a meaning 
both for himself and for others. 
In actual fact, when we look at the different modes of mystical experience in 
their respective contexts we do not discern a underlying common essence in them. 
Rather, it is the diversity of mystical experiences that impresses us. The a priori 
philosophical preconception that there must be something in common between the 
various forms of mystical experience causes some thinkers to neglect anything that 
does not fit that assumption and to gloss over the irreducible differences that exist 
between, say, Christian and Buddhist mysticism. 
It is worthwhile emphasising this point with regard to Meister Eckhart who 
has been the darling of those who wish to argue that there is a unity of religious 
experience among the great mystics. At first sight, Eckhart's account of his religious 
experience - with its focus on the divine ineffability or 'nothingness' and the 
'annihilation' of the individual soul in union with God, and on 'emptiness' and the 
'void' and so on- can appear to be Buddhistic and non-Western. But in fact Eckhart's 
account of his mystical experience is an expression - albeit a highly original one - of 
a number of fundamental themes in Christian theology and philosophical theology 
from scriptural sources relating to the 'inhabitation' of the persons of the Trinity in 
the soul, the Plotinian neo-Platonism of the Pseudo-Dionysius with its 'negative 
theology', medieval Aristotelianism influenced by the great Islamic interpreter Ibn 
Sina (Avicenna) and even theories about the influence of the stars on human beings. 
One of the best commentators on Eckhart, Alain de Libera, has in fact summed up 
Eckhart's teaching as "a serene culmination of medieval Aristotelianism" (de Libera 
1991:25) 3• 
We cannot then make a sharp distinction between 'religious experience' and 
the 'interpretation' of that experience, which assumes that religious experience is 
theory or interpretation independent and that religious experiences are analogous to 
the basic perceptual experiences of the empiricist as though we could, as it were, 
abstract religious experiences from their respective interpretive contexts - Jewish 
and Christian and Islamic theism, Buddhist a-theism, Hindu pantheism - and then 
see that they are all experiences of 'the unity of all beings'. But, as we have seen, it 
is impossible to do this. Religious experiences do not occur- and cannot occur -in a 
vacuum or in a decontextualised state. 
Beyond absolutism and exclusivism 
To return to the main positions with regard to Christianity's relationship with 
other world religions, the third position argues that, while Christianity is the 
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paradigmatic religious and spiritual 'way', other spiritual ways also have their own 
positive value and cannot simply be rejected as deficient or false or as forms of 
superstition and idolatry . By following the way provided by their own traditions, or 
the basic moral law available to everyone, people can be saved as 'implicit Christians' 
or 'Christians by desire' or 'anonymous Christians', though what is valuable in 
those traditions can be found in a much fuller and richer and explicit way in 
Christianity. Christianity is the religious and spiritual way par excellence and the 
value of other religious ways can only be seen by reference to Christianity. (The 
great scholar of comparative religion, R.C. Zaehner, has for example argued that the 
theocentric tendencies of the Bhagavad Gita can only be fully appreciated by reference 
to the view of God that emerges in the central tradition of Christian mysticism 
(Zaehner 1968)). 
A similar position seems to have been adopted in classical Judaism. Thus 
Bernard Lewis, an eminent Near Eastern Studies scholar, says that 
.. while Jews claim that the truths of their faith are universal, they do not claim 
that they are exclusive. Judaism is for Jews and those who care to join them. 
But, according to a well-known Talmudic dictum, the righteousness of all peoples 
and faiths have their place in paradise. The rabbis relate that before the Ten 
Commandments given to Moses there were seven commandments revealed in 
the time of Noah, and these were for all humanity. Only two of them, the bans 
on idolatry and blasphemy, are theological: all the rest, including the prohibition 
of murder, robbing, cruelty etc., are no more than the basic rules of human 
social co-existence. Since Judaism makes no claim to exclusive truth, salvation, 
according to Jewish teaching, is attainable for non-Jews, provided that they 
practice monotheism and morality (Lewis 1996:46). 
Nevertheless it is clear that in practice that the classical rabbinic authorities 
saw Judaism as the central form of religion by reference to which the value of other 
forms of religious teaching and practice could be judged. 
Lewis also remarks that "from a Muslim point of view, neither Judaism nor 
Christianity is a false religion. Both were in origin based on authentic revelations, 
but both are superseded by the final and perfect revelation vouchsafed to Muhammad 
in the Koran". Lewis goes on to say that that, "the principle has always been adopted 
in Muslim law and usually in practice that Christians and Jews - but not atheists, 
polytheists or idolators - are entitled to the protection of the Muslim state" (Lewis 
1996:49). Indeed, a contemporary Muslim scholar has said that "here are 
those ... within the Islamic world who realise that the destinies oflslam and Christianity 
are intertwined, that God has willed both religions to exist and to be ways of salvation 
for millions of human beings ... and that Christianity is a dispensation willed by heaven 
not only as a historical background to Islam but as a revelation destined to guide a 
sector of humanity until the second coming of its founder" (Nasr 1986: 11). 
However, the main Muslim position seems to be that Islam is the central 
religious revelation, even though certain other forms of monotheism may have some 
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degree of religious value of their own. 
The third position represents a considerable progress over the absolutism and 
exclusivism of the first position but it still stops short of according a positive religious 
value to the other religions and of recognising that aspects of 'the divine' have been 
revealed in other religious systems, and that authentic religious values which have 
not been developed within Christianity or Islam, for example, have been developed 
in those systems. As it has been said, "what we are left with is a set of competing 
absolutisms, each of which claims to be privileged and, in some sense, to be judging 
the others". (Barnes 1989). 
Tofus Deus but not tofus Dei 
The fourth view attempts to acknowledge that other religious systems can 
have a positive and autonomous value of their own and that the fact of religious 
diversity has a positive meaning. In this view religious diversity is no longer an 
accidental or contingent feature of religions: it is, in a sense, a necessary feature and 
has been deliberately willed by God. 
It is interesting to note that Aquinas, in discussing why there is a variety and 
diversity of creatures, uses the following argument: 
The distinctiveness and plurality of things is because the primary agent, who is 
God, intended them. For he brought things into existence so that his goodness 
might be communicated to creatures and re-enacted through them. And because 
one single creature was not enough for this, he produced many and diverse 
creatures so that what was wanting in one expression of the divine goodness 
might be supplied by another, for goodness, which in God is single and all 
together, in creatures is multiple and scattered. Hence the whole universe less 
incompletely shares and represents his goodness than one thing alone. (Summa 
Theologiae:la. 47.1) 
Aquinas is here speaking of the diversity of creatures and he does not use the 
same argument of the diversity of revelations. However, it could be so used in an 
analogous way. 
Thus, a Christian will hold that the Christian tradition has a privileged or 
paradigmatic status in that it is claimed that it is in the person of Jesus Christ that 
God has revealed himself most fully (but not exhaustively) to us. But at the same 
time the Christian believer will acknowledge that other religious systems can also 
contain authentic revelation. As John Hick puts it, Christians can say that God is 
truly to be encountered in Jesus but not only in Jesus. Jesus, he says, is totus Deus, 
that is, one who is totally expressive of God, but not totus Dei, that is, the exhaustive 
expression or revelation of God (Hick & Knitter 1987). 
A more qualified version of this fourth position has been put forward in a 
famous (or infamous) essay on Christianity and world religions written in 1961 by 
the great Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. Rahner emphasises that while for the 
Christian, Christ is the "final, unsurpassable, irreversible" historical realisation of 
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what God is doing in history, at the same time non-Christian religions can be "a 
positive means of gaining the right relationship to God and thus for the attaining of 
salvation - a means which is therefore positively included in God's plan for 
salvation"(Rahner 1966: 115-134). Thus, according to Rahner, religions such as Islam 
or Buddhism which in effect do not accept that Christ is the sole manifestation of 
God or of the divine in human history, can nevertheless be positive ways of gaining 
"the right relationship to God and of attaining salvation and as such be "positively 
included in God's plan for salvation". Rahner refers to believers of good will in 
other religions as "anonymous Christians", an unfortunate description which has 
given great offence. However, as it has been pointed out: "Rahner proposed the 
theory of anonymous Christianity not for proclamation to outsiders but solely for 
Christian consumption ... to convince Christians that God's saving presence is greater 
than humans and the Church" (Wong 1994: 609-634) 4• It is this latter idea which is 
centrally important in Rahner's thought. (Rahner relates that he was once asked by 
the Japanese philosopher Nishitani, "What would you say ifi were to treat you as an 
anonymous Zen Buddhist?" Rahner's response was that Nishitani should in fact 
treat him in exactly this way.) (Rahner 1979: 219) 
A similar position is taken up by Raimundo Pannikar (at least in his earlier 
writings) who, while maintaining the paradigmatic status of Christ, at the same 
time acknowledges that other world religions have their own positive value as quasi-
autonomous 'revelations' of the divine. (Pannikar 1984) However, this is not an 
exclusively Christian position since in certain forms of Buddhism a similar stance is 
adopted. Thus in the particular tradition of Buddhism to which the Dalai Lama 
belongs (the dGe lugs - 'Geluk' - tradition founded in the 14th century) it is 
emphasised that Buddhism does not make exclusivist claims for its corpus of religious 
truth and that other religious ways have their own value. As it has been put: " ..... just 
as the Buddha taught many teachings within Buddhism to suit those at different 
levels, it is appropriate for a Buddhist (and may be true) to see other religions as 
teachings of the compassionate Buddha for those in different circumstances and 
situations. But at the same time this tradition maintains that the final truth is that of 
Madhyamaka Buddhism as understood by the Geluk tradition" (Williams 1991:520). 
This tradition has a well-defined philosophical methodology which emphasises the 
importance of analytic rationality and rejects any kind of epistemological relativism 
or pluralism. In consequence: "In terms of reasoning to find the ultimate truth, if 
carried out correctly and without bias the Dalai Lama holds as himself and Buddhist, 
in common with all dGe lugs (Geluk) practitioners, that only Buddhism will be 
found to make final sense" (Williams 1991:520). 
From one point of view this position could be seen to be an extended version 
of the third position looked at before, namely that while other religions may have 
their own quasi-autonomous value as authentic 'revelations' their value is to be 
measured finally in terms of the paradigmatic or 'standard' or model religion, 
whatever that may be (Christianity, Buddhism, Islam etc.). However, the fourth 
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position makes use of the important notion of the 'development' of what I have 
called the original revelation of a religion. In the discussion of ecumenism between 
the Christian Churches it has been recognised that certain values may be developed 
in one form of Christianity and not in others. So also it could be argued that in the 
wider sphere of the world religions, certain authentic religious values that are 
implicitly in the Christian revelation, but which have not been actually developed or 
actualised within the historical forms of Christianity, may be manifested or expressed 
in Hinduism or Buddhism or Islam etc. Of course, the same is true of the other 
religions vis-a-vis Christianity and the other world religions. (But, as I have remarked, 
the notion of 'development' badly needs clarification). 
A pluralism of autonomous and incommensurable revelations 
Some Christian thinkers have attempted to meet the difficulties of the third 
position, namely that it does not sufficiently recognise the autonomy of other religions, 
by taking up a much more radical position which sees Christianity as simply one 
among a number of competing, completely autonomous and quasi-incommensurable 
'revelations'. Thus John Hick argues for a theocentric religious perspective that 
would replace our present Christocentric view: Christianity would then become one 
approach to God among a number of other, equally valid, approaches (Hick 1977). 
Again, in a recent essay, Pannikar argues that because Reality transcends human 
consciousness there can be multiple or plural human approaches to Reality in the 
world religions. They are, as it were, different windows onto Reality, each 
autonomously valid in their own way. The appropriate response to this realisation is 
what Pannikar calls, 'cosmic confidence' which enables us to be sure that what we 
do not fully understand or may appear to be contradictory and unintelligible, will 
ultimately prove not to be so. There is, Pannikar claims, an 'invisible harmony' 
among the many different and apparently discordant religious revelations (Pannikar 
1988). 
In Pannikar's later work he distinguishes between 'Christ' as a universal 
principle - the most powerful symbol of the absolute reality which Pannikar calls 
'the Mystery'- and Jesus, an historical figure who expresses or is an epiphany of the 
Christ symbol. According to Pannikar, while it is correct to say that 'Jesus is Christ', 
that is a particular expression of the universal Christ, it is not correct to say that 
'Christ is Jesus'. After all, the eternal Christ, or the Second Person of the Trinity, or 
the Logos, existed before the historical Jesus. As we have noted, for Pannikar, Jesus 
is a special epiphany of the Christ principle but the latter is also expressed in other 
religious figures and also has other names such as Rama or Krishna. Each name is 
an expression of the same Mystery and each manifests an unknown dimension of 
Christ (Pannikar 1981) 5• 
An even more radical version of this pluralist theory has been proposed by the 
remarkable French Islamicist, Henry Corbin for whom pluralism and diversity is a 
necessary and inescapable feature of religion or 'the divine'. When the one 
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transcendent reality is manifested in the world of human history it cannot but be 
manifested or revealed, Corbin argues, as many, that is, as diverse and plural. Drawing 
on the great neo-Platonist, Proclus, the 12th century Persian Zoroastrian thinker, 
Sohrawardi and the 12th century Spanish Muslim thinker Ibn Al' Arabi, Corbin 
sums up this idea in the striking phrase Non Deus nisi Dii ('There is no God without 
Gods'). "It is", he says, "in the very nature of the Theotes (deitas abscondita} to be 
revealed and made manifest by the plurality of its theophanies, in an unlimited 
number of theophanic forms" 6• 
There is a strong connection here with the neo-Platonic doctrine that the 
transcendent One is necessarily refracted into many 'eternal forms' which are in 
tum expressed in a multiplicity of 'sensible forms' as they come to be manifested in 
the world of space and time and materiality (Hadot 1988). Corbin argues that we 
must resist the temptation to see the different theophanies as partial or fragmentary. 
In one sense they are partial as compared with the hidden divinity of which they are 
manifestations, but in another sense they are not, since the fullness of Theotes is in 
each. "The uniquely Divine aspires to be revealed and can only be revealed in multiple 
theophanies. Each one is autonomous, different from the other, each quite close to 
being a hypostasis, yet at the same time the totality of Theotes is in each theophanic 
form". Corbin claims that Jewish and Christian monotheism confuses "the uniqueness 
of Divinity (Theotes) with a singular God (theos) which excludes other gods (theoi)" 
and he argues for the recognition of a pluralism of theophanic forms. (In passing, 
one must remember that Christian monotheism is radically qualified by the doctrine 
of the Trinity of the divine Persons in orthodox Christianity). 
This opens the way, he says, for a return of the idea of the Angels (as in 
Proclus and also in the Jewish Kabbala). "The Angel is the Face that our God takes 
for us, and each of us finds his God only when he recognises that Face. The service 
which we can render others is to help them to encounter that Face" (Corbin 1981). 
Corbin's extraordinary theory obviously has revolutionary implications for 
our concept of God or the Divine and of God's relationship with the world of human 
history, and above all for the Christian view of God's unique incarnation and 
revelation in Jesus Christ. If Corbin were right we could contemplate the possibility 
of a plurality of 'incarnations' of which the incarnation of Jesus would simply be 
one. If the syncretist/relativist position we looked at before sees the various religious 
systems as different paths up the same mountain, Corbin's position almost suggests 
that there are a number of quite different (incommensurable) mountains, or in other 
words multiple revelations (Spacing suddenly increases). 
Multiple revelations: difficulties 
However, attractive as someaspects of Corbin's theory about religious diversity 
are - it certainly recognises the autonomy and integrity of each of the religious 
revelations- it clearly depends upon a full-blown neo-Platonic metaphysics where 
the One is necessarily expressed in a multiplicity of forms. And, quite apart from the 
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intrinsic difficulties of that metaphysical theory, there is another difficulty in that, as 
a specific philosophical position, it conflicts with the philosophical theories that are 
bound up implicitly with other religious systems. Thus, as we have seen, for both 
Pannikar and Corbin religious diversity is explained and made acceptable, on the 
basis of a philosophical theory which sharply distinguishes between God or Reality 
on the one hand and its manifestations or 'theophanies' on the other. But in many 
religious systems it is not possible to make such a distinction. Thus, for example, in 
the dGe lugs Buddhist tradition of the Dalai Lama, which is bound up with the 
philosophical ideas of the Madhyamaka movement in Indian Buddhism, there is no 
Absolute Reality and the ultimate truth is the realisation that there is no Absolute 
but 'emptiness'. As it has been put, "Emptiness equals absence of inherent existence, 
which is to say lacking ultimate existence or essence. When Madhyamika Buddhists 
say something is 'empty', they mean that it does not exist from its own side apart 
from, say, its parts. All, absolutely all, is dependent, relative. Emptiness is the ultimate 
truth - that is the ultimate truth is told when we say that all things, no matter how 
exalted, be they Buddha, Nirvana or worms are empty of ultimate, i.e. independent, 
existence. The range of this even includes emptiness itself (Williams 1991:516). 
The Buddhists of this tradition then simply reject Pannikar's and Corbin's 
philosophical framework which enables them to make a place for religious pluralism 
in the radical way described. Pannikar can only justify his theory that the many 
different religious systems are 'windows' looking out on Reality in terms of 
philosophical theory and the same is true of Corbin's theophanies of the 'hidden' 
Divinity. 
One might mention in passing that to some extent the same is true of Australian 
Aboriginal religions which are profoundly immanentist in orientation so that it is 
difficult to make the distinction- common in Judaism, Christianity and Islam- between 
a transcendent sphere of the Divine and the local manifestations of the transcendent 
reality. In Australian Aboriginal religions spiritual power resides in the land and 
natural phenomena. No doubt, in the mythic stories that spiritual power (karunpa, 
awangarr as it variously called) is deposited in the land by the Ancestor Spirits in 
the primordial beginning of things, but the Ancestor Spirits are not gods nor 
theophanic beings nor even exemplars of Divinity. In such a religious system it is 
impossible to make the neo-Platonic distinction between the one Divinity and the 
multiple theophanies which is the basis for Pannikar's and Corbin's theoretical 
solutions to the problem of religious diversity. 
Similar reservations have been made regarding cultural differences about the 
nature of time between the Hindu and Taoist cyclic view of time and the Christian 
linear view. In Hinduism and Taoism the incarnation of Jesus Christ as an individual 
historical event is difficult to conceptualise. Christ as the universal Logos is easier 
to conceptualise within these cultures and it is doubtless because of this that Pannikar 
and others have focussed on the 'universal Christ' 7• 
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Conclusion 
We seem then to be left with the fourth position outlined above as the best 
solution we have to the problem of religious diversity. No doubt this will be far too 
radical for some religious believers in that, while it allows a believer to hold that his 
or her religion has some kind of special or paradigmatic status, it also admits that 
genuine religious developments (indeed religious revelations) may take place in 
other religions. On the other hand, it will not be radical enough for other people 
who will see it as denying the integrity and autonomy of other religious ways and 
sanctioning some degree of religious exclusivity and 'intolerance'. In other words, 
by seeing Christianity as having some essential core of truth that Buddhism lacks, I 
am claiming superiority for Christianity. And vice versa, if I claim that Buddhism is 
the privileged way of enlightenment, I am claiming superiority for Buddhism vis-a-
vis Christianity. 
A final point: in one sense the problem of religious diversity is a philosophical 
problem: how can we make sense of a situation where various religious systems are 
making what appear to be mutually contradictory truth-claims? In another sense, to 
speak from a Christian perspective, the problem of religious diversity is a theological 
problem where we are ultimately confronted with a 'mystery' which cannot be wholly 
explained by philosophical means but which can be shown not to involve a formal 
contradiction which would render it unintelligible and unbelievable. In traditional 
Christian Trinitarian theology, for example, the 'mystery' is how the unicity of God 
is reconciled with the recognition that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
properly described as 'God'. Since we cannot say that there are three Gods, nor that 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are merely three aspects of the one God, the 
philosophical notion of 'person' is introduced, not to explain the Trinity but, in a 
sense, to make it clear that belief in the Trinity does not on the one hand, involve 
belief in the existence of three Gods and (as Muslim critics believe) the rejection of 
the unicity of God, and does not on the other hand, involve a belief that the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit are mere aspects of the one God. Allowing for the moment that 
the theological notion of 'person' is meaningful, its function is a negative one in 
that it tells the believer how not to see the Trinity. 
In the case of religious diversity, the 'mystery' is how there can be a 
reconciliation of the truth that God (because he is good and compassionate) desires 
that all human beings be saved or achieve enlightenment and that they have, in 
some way, access to the means of salvation or enlightenment through some mode of 
revelation; and, on the other hand, the truth that there is in reality prima facie a 
diversity of religious revelations. We cannot explain in any positive sense how this 
reconciliation is possible, but we can, perhaps show what is not involved in believing 
that God wills that all should be offered the means of salvation or enlightenment 
and on the other hand, recognition of the fact of religious diversity. 
Operationally, what does all this abstruse speculation mean for the ordinary 
religious believer who confronts the problem of religious diversity? Let us put our 
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reply in the form of a credo for the religious believer. 
1. I believe that 'God' 8 wills that all should be saved or achieve enlightenment 
and that all human beings have access to the means of salvation or 
enlightenment through some mode of revelation. 
2. I believe (as a Christian, or a Jew, or a Muslim, or a Hindu or Buddhist etc.) 
that my religious tradition has a privileged and paradigmatic· status and that 
'God' has revealed himself most completely - even if not exclusively - in that 
tradition. 
3. I believe that certain authentic religious values which are implicit or latent 
within my tradition, but which have not actually been developed within that 
tradition, may be manifested or expressed in other religious traditions. 
4. I believe that there is also the possibility of authentic religious revelations, 
complementary to the paradigmatic revelation of my tradition but 'outside' my 
own tradition and, in a sense, incommensurable with it. 
5. I believe that religious diversity is in some sense willed by 'God' and has its 
own intrinsic meaning and purpose and is not merely the result of sin and 
ignorance. 
6. I believe that respect for, openness to, and dialogue with, other religious 
traditions, must be part of any authentic religious tradition. 
Religious believers have to work out what this credo means with regard to 
their own particular religion and what kind of restructuring of belief and the 
institutions of belief it requires. One might say that this is a task even more radical 
and momentous than that which confronted the early Christian communities when 
they realised that the second coming of Jesus was not imminent. 
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Endnotes 
1. See Vatican Secretariat for non-Christians (1984). 
2. See the ingenious interpretation of the Tower of Babel myth by Jacques Derrida (1985) 
who sees God's 'deconstruction' of the Tower, meant to unify heaven and earth, as a 
deconstruction of the vain human hope for literal and universal unity of meaning. 
3. On Eckhart see De Libera (1991), chapter VITI. See also the illuminating study by Oliver 
Davies (1991), especially chapter 9, Mister Eckhart and Christian Orthodoxy. 
4. On the development of Rahner's thought on world religions see the remarkable article by 
Joseph H. Wong (1994). 
5. See also the work of John B. Cobb (1975), which distinguishes between Christ as the 
Logos or the transcendent principle of 'creative transformation' in the world, and Jesus as the 
perfect incarnation of the Logos and the supreme embodiment of humanity. 
6. I am grateful to David Tacey's unpublished paper, Many Gods, Many Ways and the Sacred 
for this reference to Corbin. 
7. See Wong (1994), for a brilliant attempt to reconcile Rahner's Christo logical and Trinitarian 
position with classical Taoism. 
8. 'God' here is taken to mean any source of revelation or disclosure of 'the divine'. 
